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Leverage Ratios  
ABSTRACT
The Basel III Leverage Ratio, as originally agreed upon in December 2010, has recently undergone 
revisions and updates – both in relation to those proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision – as well as proposals introduced in the United States. Whilst recent proposals have 
been introduced by the Basel Committee to improve, particularly, the denominator component of 
the Leverage Ratio, new requirements have been introduced in the U.S to upgrade and increase 
these ratios, and it is those updates which relate to the Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratio that 
have  primarily  generated  a  lot  of  interests.  This  is  attributed  not  only  to  concerns  that  many 
subsidiaries  of  US  Bank  Holding  Companies  (BHCs)  will  find  it  cumbersome  to  meet  such 
requirements,  but  also  to  potential  or  possible  increases  in  regulatory  capital  arbitrage:  a 
phenomenon which plagued the era  of  the original  1988 Basel  Capital  Accord and which also 
partially provided impetus for the introduction of Basel II.  
This paper is aimed at providing an analysis of the recent updates which have taken place in respect 
of  the Basel III Leverage Ratio and the Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratio – both in respect 
of recent amendments introduced by the Basel Committee and proposals introduced in the United 
States. It will also consider the consequences – as well as the impact - which the U.S Leverage 
ratios  could have on Basel  III.  There  are  ongoing debates  in  relation  to  revision by the Basel 
Committee, as well as the most recent U.S proposals to update Basel III Leverage ratios and whilst 
these revisions have been welcomed to a large extent, in view of the need to address Tier One 
capital requirements and exposure criteria, there is every likelihood, indication, as well as tendency 
that many global systemically important banks (GSIBS), and particularly their subsidiaries, will 
resort to capital arbitrage. What is likely to be the impact of the recent proposals in the U.S.? 
The recent U.S proposals are certainly very encouraging and should also serve as impetus for other 
jurisdictions to adopt a pro-active approach – particularly where existing ratios or standards appear 
to be inadequate. This paper also adopts the approach of evaluating the causes and consequences of 
the most recent updates by the Basel Committee, as well as those revisions which have taken place 
in the U.S, by attempting to balance the merits of the respective legislative updates and proposals. 
The value of adopting leverage ratios as a supplementary regulatory tool will also be illustrated by 
way of reference to the impact of the recent legislative changes on risk taking activities, as well as 
the need to also supplement capital adequacy requirements with the Basel Leverage ratios and the 
Basel liquidity standards.
Key Words: global systemically important banks (G-SIBs), risk weighted assets, leverage ratios, 
harmonisation, accounting rules, capital arbitrage, disclosure, stress testing techniques,  U.S Basel 
III Final Rule
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A. Introduction
The first consultative paper on a new capital adequacy framework, which was issued by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, introduced the „three pillar“ model which encompasses the 
minimum capital requirements, supervisory review  and market discipline - „as a lever to strengthen 
disclosure and encourage safe and sound banking practices.“2 As well as the criticism related to the 
fact that it rewarded risk lending, the fact that „capital requirements were just reasonably related to 
bank's risk taking and that the credit exposure requirement was the same regardless of the credit 
rating of the borrower,“3 a general criticism of Basel I relates to the fact that it promoted capital 
arbitrage. Such capital arbitrage being attributed to its wide risk categories which provided banks 
with the liberty to „arbitrage between their economic assessment of risk and the regulatory capital 
requirements.“4
„Regulatory capital arbitrage“, a practice which involves banks „using securitisation to alter the 
profile of their book“ usually produces the effect of making bank's capital ratios appear inflated.5 
Four identified types of capital arbitrage are:6 cherry picking, securitisation with partial recourse, 
remote origination and indirect credit.
The Second Consultative Paper, issued by the Basel Committee in January 2001, introduced the two 
Internal  Ratings  Based  (IRB)  methodologies  –  the  Foundational  IRB  and  the  Advanced  IRB 
methodologies. The Internal Ratings Based approach to capital requirements for credit risk, not only 
relies significantly on the internal assessment carried out by a bank, in relation to counterparties and 
exposures, but is also geared towards the achievement of two primary goals, namely:7 „additional 
risk sensitivity“ and „incentive compatibility“.
Basel 2 is premised on a three level approach which permits banks to select from three models, 
namely:  the  basic  standardized  model,  the  IRB foundation  approach  and  the  advanced  ratings 
approach. According to the Consultative Document on Standard Approach to Credit Risk,8 capital 
1 Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com
2  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Consultative Paper on a New Capital Adequacy Framework'  3rdJune 
1999 <http://www.bis.org/press/p990603.htm> 
3 See M Saidenberg and T Schuermann, 'The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Research' (2003) Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 2003 at page 4
4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basel 
Accord' Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers April 1999 at page 21
5 See ibid; Bank's capital ratio may appear inflated „relative to the riskiness of the remaining exposure“ see ibid
6 Ibid at pages 22-24
7 In establishing an Internal Ratings Based approach, the Commitee's intention was directed at „fine tuning capital 
requirements with a greater degree of accuracy to the level of a bank's exposure to credit risks.“ Basel Committee on 
Banking  Supervision,  'The  Internal  Ratings  Based  Approach'  Supporting  Document  to  the  New Basel  Capital 
Accord 2001 at pages 1 and 3 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf 
8 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Standard Approach to Credit Risk, Supporting 
Document to the New Basel Accord January 2001 at page 1 http;//www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf
3requirements  under  the  standardized  approach  are  considered  to  be  more  syncronised  and  in 
harmony  with  the  principal  elements  of  banking  risk  –  owing  to  the  introduction  of  more 
differentiated risk weights and a broader recognition of techniques which are applied in mitigating 
risk whilst such techniques attempt to avoid undue complexity. As a result, capital ratios generated 
through the standardized approach, should adapt more to present and actual risks encountered by 
banks, than was the case previously. 
Under Pillar One minimum capital requirements, operational risk is to be corroborated by capital. 
Measurement approaches for operational risk can be found in the Capital Requirements Directive 
(CRD) and there are three broad approaches to the capital assessment of operational risk which are 
as follows:
− Basic Indicator Approaches
− Standardized Approaches
− Internal Measurement Approach
The developments and evolution across the Basel Capital Accords have illustrated their focus to 
address prevailing financial risks at the time, their focus on the regulation of complex financial 
instruments  such  as  hedge  funds,  the  pro  cyclical  nature  of  risks  and  the  need  to  mitigate 
occurrences  related  to  regulatory capital  arbitrage.  The era  of  Basel  III  has  also witnessed the 
introduction of liquidity standards – these being the first of their kind, However the need to address 
off  balance  sheet  instruments,  complex  derivative  products,  exposures  of  various  kinds  -  and 
particularly those exposures relating to derivatives, off balance sheet and leverage, as well as those 
risks attributed to non bank institutions, continually constitute a vital focal point.
This paper is structured as follows: The next section then considers the reasons attributable to the 
introduction of  Basel III Leverage and Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratios as well as its vital 
role as a supplementary measure to the risk based capital adequacy framework. Whilst highlighting 
the merits and advantages of the Basel Leverage Ratio, subsection BII also illustrates why revisions 
and updates to the Basel Leverage Ratio were deemed necessary if the Basel Committee's broad 
goals  and  objectives  of  fostering  financial  stability  are  to  be  achieved.  In  this  respect  it  also 
incorporates the background and  factors which have provided the impetus for the recent proposals 
in the U.S – as well as those proposals and guidelines initiated by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision in June 2013. From the perspective of the proposals undertaken in the U.S, factors auch 
as the „Too Big To Fail Effect“ are considered. Further, whilst the recent proposals in the U.S are to 
an extent, targeted at increasing the leverage ratios, those revisions currently being undertaken by 
the Basel Committee – as stated in the June 2013 guidleines, are, to an extent,  targeted at revising 
the components of the Basel Leverage Ratios.
Section C then considers the Basel Leverage Ratio's role as a supplementary measure to the risk 
based capital adequacy framework, as well as the impact of the recent legislative proposals and 
changes on risk taking activities. Components of the Basel III Level Ratio and recent proposals 
aimed at updating such components are considered – with the aim of highlighting the importance of 
such updates in the minimisation of regulatory capital arbitrage activities. Section D then considers 
not only the events leading up to (as well as culminating) in the 2013 Rule and the Final Rule, but 
also arguments put forward to bolster U.S proposals to update the Basel Leverage Ratio. 
 In concluding the paper, reference is made to the all important need to achieve a balance between 
the need for consistency, comparability and improved harmonisation whilst ensuring that simplicity 
and a „one size fits  all“ approach  does not promote a situation whereby credible and accurate 
4results are neglected at the expense of achieving a standardized approach. This is partly illustrated 
by way of reference to bank stress testing techniques.
B Basel III Leverage and Basel III Supplementary Leverage Ratios
The Basel III Leverage Ratio was established by the Basel Committee as a non risk based measure 
which is intended to serve as a supplement to the Basel risk based capital framework. The merits of 
the Leverage Ratio as a supplement to the risk based capital adequacy framework include:9 i) Its 
constrain of the build up of leverage in the banking sector – which the risk based regime is not 
equipped to address; ii) Through a non-risk based „back stop“ which ultimately serves to protect 
against  model  risk,  and  the  reduction  of  capital  requirements,  its  re  inforcement  of  risk based 
requirements; iii) Its role as a standardized measure that investors and counterparties can use in 
making  comparisons  between  banks  over  a  period  of  time;  iv)  The  establishment  by  certain 
academics that the leverage ratio is a „statistically significant“ predictor of potential bank failures.
Hence it can be illustrated that the Basel III Leverage ratio not only serves as a supplementary 
measure to the risk based capital adequacy framework, but also a means whereby the facilitation of 
greater comparability between banks can be achieved (since standardization promotes consistency, 
enhanced transparency and disclosure). It vital role as a supplementary tool to the risk based capital 
adequacy framework in countering risk taking incentives will later be highlighted under section B II 
– which immediately follows this section.
− An underlying feature of  the financial  crisis  was the build-up of  excessive on-  and off-
balance  sheet  leverage  in  the  banking  system.  In  many cases,  banks  built  up  excessive  
leverage while maintaining strong risk-based capital ratios. At the height of the crisis, the  
market  forced  the  banking  sector  to  reduce  its  leverage  in  a  manner  that  amplified  
downward pressure on asset prices. This deleveraging process exacerbated  the feedback  
loop between losses, falling  bank capital, and shrinking credit availability.10
The Basel III reforms introduced a „simple,  transparent,  non-risk based leverage ratio which is 
intended  to  serve  –  not  only  as  a  „credible  supplementary  measure  to  the  risk-based  capital 
requirements“ but  also:11
•  restrict  the build-up of leverage in the banking sector to avoid destabilising deleveraging 
processes that can damage the broader financial system and the economy; and
•  reinforce the risk-based requirements with a simple, non-risk-based “backstop” measure. 
 Furthermore, the Basel Committee is of the view that:12
•  a simple leverage ratio framework is critical and complementary to the risk-based capital 
framework; and 
•  a credible leverage ratio is one that ensures broad and adequate capture of both the on- and 
off-balance sheet leverage of banks. 
Even  though  this  subsection  is  exclusively  dedicated  to  highlighting  the  benefits  of  the  Basel 
Leverage Ratio,  reasons for recent  proposals  aimed at  updating the originally introduced Basel 
9 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Discussion Paper 'The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk 
Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability“ July 2013 Bank for International Settlements Publications at page 16
10  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Revised Basel  III Leverage Ratio Framework 
and Disclosure Requirements  June 2013 at page 4 of 22 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs251.pdf
11 ibid
12 ibid
5Leverage Ratio will be considered in the ensuing section.
B.II Basel Committee's Efforts to Update Original 2010 Basel III Leverage Ratios and U.S 
Proposals to Increase Basel Leverage Ratios
In November 2011, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) issued a document13, 
„Global  Systemically  Important  Banks:  Assessment  Methodology  and  the  Additional  Loss 
Absorbency Requirement,  which  „sets  out  a  framework for  a  new capital  surcharge  for  global 
systemically important banks ( the BCBS framework)“.
  
The BCBS framework:
− Is intended to strengthen the capital position of the global systemically important banking 
organizations  (G-SIBs)  beyond  the  requirements  of  other  banking  organizations  by 
expanding the capital conservation buffer for these organizations.
− Incorporates five broad characteristics of a banking organization that the agencies consider 
to  be  good  proxies  for,  and  correlated  with,  systemic  importance  –  size,  complexity, 
interconnectedness, lack of substitutes, and cross-border activity.
The document „Global Systemically Important Banks: Updated Assessment Methodology and the 
Higher  Loss  Absorbency  Requirement“  updates  and  replaces  the  November  2011  publication 
Global  Systemically  Important  Banks:  Assessment  Methodology  and  the  Additional  Loss 
Absorbency  Requirement.  According  to  the  Committeee,  changes  in  relation  to  the  updated 
publication  reflect  the  lessons  learnt  from  applying  the  assessment  methodology  using  data 
submitted by banks in respect of their positions as at the financial year-ends 2009 to 2011. Further, 
it is highlighted that the changes also include the addition of the disclosures that banks are required 
to make to ensure that  the assessment methodology operates on the basis  of publicly available 
information. Further changes related to the publication are as follows:
− Methodology for determining the sample of banks.
− Indicator definitions. 
− The Wholesale Funding Ratio, which was one of the three indicators in the 
interconnectedness category in the November 2011 publication and  which has been 
replaced with a Securities Outstanding indicator. 
Several  revisions, particularly relating to the denominator component of the Basel III  Leverage 
Ratio,  have  recently  been  undertaken  by the  Basel  Committee,  as  illustrated  in  its  June  2013 
guidelines.  From this viewpoint, measures aimed at minimising regulatory capital arbitrage become 
all the more evident since banks are able to manipulate their way into increasing the leverage ratio 
by getting many assets allowed in the numerator and as little in the denominator: „cherry picking“ 
arbitrage having constituted a problem since the original Basel Capital Accord. Hence it could be 
argued that it is not the mere increase of leverage ratios that truly matters (even though this is also 
important), but measures aimed at ensuring that permissible contents/instruments are incorporated 
into the numerators and denominators of such leverage ratios. 
13  Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, 'Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodology and 
the Additional Loss Absorbency Requirement' July 2013  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.pdf
6Certain factors influential in the recent proposals and efforts aimed at achieving higher leverage 
capital requirements, according to U.S federal agencies,14 include the belief that higher standards for 
the  supplementary  leverage  ratio  would  reduce  the  likelihood  of  resolutions,  and  would  allow 
regulators more time to tailor resolution efforts in the event those are needed. In their opinion, by 
further constraining their use of leverage, higher leverage standards could offset possible funding 
cost advantages that these institutions may enjoy as a result of the “too-big-to-fail” problem, which 
will be considered in the following section.
The Too Big to Fail Problem and Its Impact on Recent Legislative Proposals
According to a notice jointly issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury; the 
Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  and  the  Federal  Deposit  Insurance,  „the 
perception continues to persist in the markets that  some companies remain  “too big to fail,” - 
posing, in their view, an ongoing threat to the financial system.15 It is also added that:16
− First, the existence of the “too-big-to-fail” problem  reduces the incentives of shareholders, 
creditors and counterparties of these companies to discipline excessive risk-taking by the 
companies.
−  Second, it  produces competitive distortions because companies perceived as “too big to 
fail” can often fund themselves at a lower cost than other companies. This distortion being 
regarded as unfair to smaller companies, damaging to fair competition, and such distortion 
tends  to  artificially  encourage  further  consolidation  and  concentration  in  the  financial 
system.
As well as the important objective of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act  of  2010  (Dodd-Frank  Act)  aimed  at  „mitigating  the  threat  to  financial  stability  posed  by 
systemically-important  financial  companies“,17 another  vital  and  important  means  of  fostering 
financial  stability  in  averting  another  Financial  Crisis,  safeguarding  and  assisting  financial 
institutions to navigate periods of financial or economic stress, in the agencies’ experience, is strong 
capital. In their opinion, the „maintenance of a strong base of capital at the largest, systemically 
important institutions is particularly important because capital shortfalls at these institutions can 
contribute  to  systemic  distress  and  can  have  material  adverse  economic  effects.  Further,  they 
contend that higher capital standards for such  institutions would place additional private capital at 
risk before the Federal deposit insurance fund and the Federal government’s resolution mechanisms 
would be called upon, and reduce the likelihood of economic disruptions caused by problems at 
these institutions.18 
14 See Federal Reserve, 'Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio 
Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and their Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions' at page 11 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20130709a1.pdf.
15 See Federal Reserve, 'Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio 
Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and their Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions' at page 7 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20130709a1.pdf.
16 ibid
17  Federal Reserve, 'Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio 
Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and their Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions' page 8
18 Ibid at page 11
7C. The Basel  Leverage Ratio's  Role as  a  Supplementary Measure to The Risk Based  
Capital Adequacy Framework
According to  Valladares,  the June 2013 proposed leverage ratios  by the Basel  Committee,  is  a 
necessary supplement to the current risk-weighted asset credit risk measurement and is crucial to 
making banks better capitalized to sustain unexpected losses.19 Even though many criticisms have 
arisen in relation to the risk taking incentives that could be induced by such recent Basel leverage 
proposals, the following observations highlight the importance of incorporating and supplementing 
risk based capital ratios, leverage ratios and the liquidity requirements with themselves since the 
implementation of one ratio in isolation, as will be highlighted, is likely to facilitate the tendencies 
for riskier ventures:
Valladares raises the point that even though critics of the proposed Basel guidelines argue that the 
leverage ratio would encourage banks to transact riskier on- or off-balance sheet instruments, that:
− if banks were to do so, such added riskiness would, however, raise banks' RWAs and force 
them to increase their capital. This action would also impact their liquidity coverage ratio by 
making the banks less liquid since most risky assets do not count for the LCR - which is 
another reason why the leverage ratio is an important complement to the RWA and liquidity 
buffers.20
In bolstering this viewpoint, Bundesbank Vice President Sabine Lautenschlaeger has re iterated  that 
„the leverage ratio shouldn’t be the main gauge because it doesn’t demand more capital to back the 
more loss-prone investments, and thus can give bankers “unhealthy incentives” to take on more 
risk.“
C.II Components of the Basel III Leverage Ratio and Recent Updates to the Components
The Basel III Leverage Ratio is defined as the Capital Measure (the numerator) divided by the 
Exposure Measure (the denominator), with this ratio expressed as a percentage and with the basis of 
calculation  being the average of the three month-end leverage ratios over a quarter.21 As reported by 
DB Research, the Basel Committee's issuance of  its consultation paper on common definitions for 
the non-binding leverage ratio enshrined in Basel III, is not only considered to be an indication of  a 
clear  preference  to  move  to  a  binding  leverage  ratio,  the  new  Basel  definition,  it  is  further 
contended,  would  „disallow  much  of  the  derivatives  netting  which  had  seen  US  banks  post 
substantially stronger leverage ratios than most European institutions.“22  
Even  though  the  numerator  component  is  also  important,  the  importance  of  focussing  on  the 
denominator component (which comprises of the  exposure measure) of the Basel III Leverage 
Ratio is also illustrated thus:
19 M Rodriguez Valladares, 'Why Basel' Latest Leverage Ratio is Better' 
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/why-basels-latest-leverage-ratio-is-better-1060635-1.html
20 ibid
21  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Revised Basel  III Leverage Ratio Framework 
and Disclosure Requirements at page 5 of 22 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs251.pdf
22  DB Research, 'Leverage ratio: Pressure on Europe is rising' http://www.dbresearch.de/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?
addmenu=false&document=PROD0000000000317297&rdShowArchivedDocus=true&rwnode=DBR_INTERNET_
DE-PROD$NAVIGATION&rwobj=ReDisplay.Start.class&rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD
8Source:23
Recent  proposals  aimed  at  enhancing  the  Basel  III  leverage  ratios  in  the  U.S  would  result  in 
increase to 5 percent of assets for parent companies and 6 percent for their banking subsidiaries 
under a proposal which will affect the eight globally systemically important banks in the U.S. In 
November 2012, the FSB and BCBS published a list of banks that meet the Basel Committee for 
Banking  Supervision  definition  of  a  G-SIB  based  on  year-end  2011  data.  The  eight  globally 
systemically important banks in the U.S, identified as G-SIBs by the Financial Stability Board, are 
Bank  of  America  Corporation,  The  Bank  of  New  York  Mellon  Corporation,  Citigroup  Inc., 
Goldman Sachs Group,  Inc., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation 
and Wells Fargo & Company.24
23 Davis Polk, 'Basel III Leverage Ratio: US Proposes American Add-On, Basel Committee Proposes Important 
Denominator Changes“ July 19 2013 at page 7
24 See Financial Stability Board, Update of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) (Nov. 1, 2012)
     http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121031ac.pdf  
9Source:25
D. The 2013 Rule and the Final Rule
The 2013 Rule „revised and replaced the agencies’ risk-based and leverage capital standards and 
established a 3 percent minimum supplementary leverage ratio for banking organizations subject to 
the agencies’ advanced approaches risk-based capital rules.“26 The 2013 rule was adopted as a final 
rule on July 2, 2013.  
Moreover, this final rule:
− Implements a revised definition of regulatory capital;
− A new common equity tier 1 minimum capital requirement;
− A  higher minimum tier 1 capital requirement; and 
For  banking  organizations  subject  to  the   advanced  approaches  risk-based  capital  rules,  a 
supplementary leverage ratio that incorporates a broader set of exposures in the denominator.27  
25  Davis Polk, 'Basel III Leverage Ratio: US Proposes American Add-On, Basel Committee Proposes Important 
Denominator Changes“ July 19 2013 at page 4
26 See  Federal  Reserve,  'Regulatory Capital  Rules:  Regulatory Capital,  Enhanced Supplementary Leverage  Ratio 
Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and their Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions' at page 12 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/bcreg20130709a1.pdf.  and  also  Federal  Reserve,  'Federal 
Reserve Approves Final Rule...' „ The final rule minimizes burden on smaller, less complex financial institutions. It 
establishes  an integrated  regulatory  capital  framework  that  addresses  shortcomings  in  capital  requirements, 
particularly for larger, internationally active banking organizations, that became apparent during the recent financial 
crisis.  The  rule  will  implement  in  the  United  States  the  Basel  III  regulatory  capital  reforms  from  the  Basel 
Committee  on  Banking Supervision  and  certain  changes  required  by the  Dodd-Frank  Wall  Street  Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act.“ See <http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20130702a.htm>
27 See Federal Reserve, Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Capital  Adequacy, 
Transition  Provisions,  Prompt  Corrective  Action,  Standardized  Approach  for  Risk-weighted  Assets,  Market 
Discipline  and  Disclosure  Requirements,Advanced Approaches Risk-Based Capital Rule, and Market Risk Capital 
Rule   http://www.federalreserve.gov/bcreg20130702a.pdf
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Following the publication of the U.S Basel III Final Rule, many U.S banking agencies proposed 
higher leverage capital requirements for the eight U.S bank holding companies (BHCs) which have 
been identified by the Financial Stability Board, as global systemically important banks („referred 
to as „covered BHCs“) and their insured depository institution (IDI) subsidiaries: namely,  Bank of 
America Corporation, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs 
Group,  Inc., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation and Wells Fargo & 
Company.
DII. Arguments put forward by US Federal Agencies in Support of Recent Proposals
According to a report by the Federal Reserve, the following arguments were provided in support  of 
the need for revisions to the Basel Leverage Ratios:28 
− BCBS’s approach for determining the minimum level of the Basel III leverage ratio was 
different than the calibration approach described above for the risk-based capital ratios.
− The BCBS used the most loss-absorbing measure of capital, common equity tier 1 capital, as 
the basis for calibration for the risk-based capital ratios, but not for the Basel III leverage 
ratio. In addition, the BCBS did not calibrate the minimum Basel III leverage ratio to meet 
explicit  loss  absorption  and  market  confidence  objectives  as  it  did  in  calibrating  the 
minimum risk-based  capital  requirements  and  did  not  implement  a  capital  conservation 
buffer level above the minimum leverage ratio. Rather, the BCBS focused on calibrating the 
Basel  III  leverage  ratio  to  be  a  backstop to  the risk-based capital  ratios  and an overall 
constraint on leverage.  
− The  agencies  believe  that  while  the  establishment  of  the  Basel  III  leverage  ratio 
internationally is an important achievement, further steps could be taken to ensure that the 
risk-based and leverage capital requirements effectively work together to enhance the safety 
and soundness of the largest, most systemically important banking organizations. 
Furthermore, the agencies are of the opinion that the proposed rule would permit covered BHCs and 
their IDI subsidiaries to fund themselves more than 90 percent with debt while still satisfying the 
proposed leverage  thresholds.29
Having highlighted the above, general consenus appears to favour proposals relating to  the increase 
of Basel Leverage ratios in the U.S – with many commentators having considered the previous 
ratios to be inadequate.
28  Federal Reserve, 'Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratio 
Standards for Certain Bank Holding Companies and their Subsidiary Insured Depository Institutions' pages 16 and 
17
29 Ibid at page 24
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Arguments Favouring Recent Basel Committee Revisions over those Updates Made to Basel 
Leverage Ratios in the U.S
In commencing this section, it needs to be highlighted that the recent moves and proposals  in the 
U.S, in relation to the Basel Leverage Ratio, are very much welcomed and quite encouraging given 
the prior concerns that the implementation of Basel rules, regulations and initiatives appeared to be 
implemented at a slow pace in the U.S. The recent proposals in the U.S serve as indication, not only 
of the willingness to adopt Basel rules, but also reveal the extra steps being taken to ensure that 
financial stability is fostered and more rigid and stringent measures to avert another global scale 
crisis. 
Arguments favouring recent Basel Committee updates over those proposals recently introduced in 
the US,  are partly based on the following:
1) The fact  that  revisions and proposals  undertaken in  the U.S are  premised on Tier  1 capital, 
instead of higher-quality Core Tier 1.
2) Recent Basel Guidelines (June 2013) are more extensive in scope as opposed to the denominator 
of the U.S. leverage ratios which are based on original 2010 Basel Leverage ratios.
3)The cumbersome nature of the supplementary leverage ratio – which in the opinion of many 
commentators,  will  be  more  burdensome  for  subsidiaries  of  BHCs  to  comply  with  than  the 
generally applicable leverage ratio for U.S. banks. It is calculated using a „tighter definition of Tier 
1 capital in the numerator and the denominator includes off-balance sheet exposures such as the 
grossing-up of derivatives to include collateral and cash.“ (which is why many banks are likely to 
want  to  evade  as  much  inclusion  of  such  derivatives  in  the  denominator  –  given  the 
value/magnitude of derivatives). The 6% standard is considered by many to be onerous for bank 
subsidiaries  covered  by  the  proposal  and  may  encourage  banking  groups  to  conduct  certain 
activities,  such  as  derivatives  based  activities,  away  from  their  subsidiaries.  Furthermore,  an 
introduction of the supplementary leverage ratio, it is most likely envisaged, will result in lower 
dividends being distributed by the BHCs.
4)The focus accorded to disclosures of the numerator and denominator components of the Basel 
Leverage Ratios  in the Basel June 2013 Guidelines.
According to paragraph 43 of the Consultative Document on the Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio 
framework and Disclosure Requirements:30 
− Public disclosure by banks of their Basel III leverage ratios commences on 1st January 2015
− To enable  market  participants  reconcile  leverage ratio  disclosures  with banks'  published 
financial statements from period to period, and to compare the capital adequacy of banks 
across jurisdictions with varying accounting frameworks, it is important that banks adopt a 
consistent  and common disclosure of  the main components  of the leverage ratios  while 
reconciling to their published financial statements.
Paragraphs 44 as well as 4531 underline the Committee's committments to, as well as its realisation 
30 June 2013, Bank for International Settlements Publications, page 11
31 Which states that „to facilitate consistency and ease of use of disclosures relating to the composition of the leverage 
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of  the  need  for  focus  on  measures  and  initiatives  aimed  at  facilitating  the  harmonisation  and 
consistency of disclosure requirements across various jurisdictional frameworks which would also 
result in the facilitation of the realisation of the Basel Commitee's objectives and aims.
The need for consistency in the implementation of Basel requirements and regulations is all the 
more vital and necessary if practices relating to regulatory capital arbitrage are to be minimised and 
controlled.  Differences  in  the  implementation  of  Basel  requirements  and  rules  across  various 
jurisdictions are evident from the very stringent application of rules in certain jurisdictions – as is 
recently evidenced by the U.S initiatives aimed at increasing Basel III Leverage ratios (above global 
standards) to those jurisdictions where more lax approaches have been adopted.
Evidence which highlights the fact that different countries could be inconsistently implementing 
parts  of  the  Basel  rules  and  regulations  –  either  by  consolidating  or  weakening  the  original 
requirements , is illustrated through the following:32
.
− In the EU, in relation to the Capital Requirements Directive/Regulation IV (CRD/RIV) - 
where based on evidence from latest  proposals and negotiations,  EU member states will 
assume greater independence in their ability to increase capital requirements.
−  In China,  where the implementation framework for Basel  III  is  considered to  be more 
stringent than the international standard (with a requirement of a higher core tier 1 capital 
adequacy ratio – 5% as opposed to 4.5%, as well as a higher leverage ratio requirement of 
4% as opposed to 3%).
− In the U.S, as discussed through this paper,  through recent proposals relating to standard 
and supplementary leverage ratios.
Having highlighted the above, it is also worth mentioning that over compliance with rules (and 
particularly where it appears that such rules or ratios appear to be insufficient) – as indicated by the 
increased ratios in the U.S, is certainly much better than under compliance.
E. Sound Bank Stress Testing Techniques As Complementary Measures
Sound stress testing practices, as identified by the Basel Committee, should embrace the provision 
of forward-looking assessments of risk, complement information from models and historical data,  - 
as well as constitute an integral part of capital and liquidity planning. Even though the Basel capital 
accords have evolved, recurring lessons related to failures of mechanical approaches such as those 
of bank stress testing techniques, provide reflections of the fact that internal ratings based models 
should not always be expected to provide credible results where standardization,  particularly,  is 
unduly resorted to. 
Standardization is certainly required for the basis of comparability – however, a healthy balance 
needs to be struck between the extent of standardization and the need to obtain credible, reliable and 
accurate results.  
ratio, and to mitigate the risk of inconsistent formats undermining the objective of enhanced disclosure, the Basel 
Commiteee has  agreed that  internationally active  banks across  Basel  member jurisdictions,  will  be required  to 
publish their leverage ratio according to a common template.“
32 See JP Morgan, 'Basel III Implementation: Is the Industry Running Out of Time?' 
http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/General/Basel_III_implementation_Is_the_industry_running_out_of_time_/13205045
12062
13
As is the case with the Basel Leverage Ratio, bank stress techniques should not be used in isolation. 
In effectively performing their roles as monitoring, predictory devices and risk management tools, 
they will greatly assist Basel Leverage ratios, as well as the risk based capital adequacy framework, 
in achieving their intended aims and objectives. According to the Basel Committee,33 the financial 
crisis not only revealed weaknesses in organisational aspects of stress testing programmes in the 
sense that prior to the crisis, stress testing at some banks was carried out on an isolated basis ( by 
the risk function with little interaction with business areas), but also the fact that test analyses were 
not credible. Furthermore, the mechanical approaches adopted by certain organisations resulted in 
inaccurate  and  unreliable  results  being  generated.  As  rightly  observed,  by  the  Committee, 
„mechanical  approaches  can  neither  fully  take  account  of  changing  business  conditions  nor 
incorporate qualitative judgments from across the different areas of a bank.“
Further  identfied  weaknesses  of  stress  testing  programmes,  as  identified  by  the  Committee 
include:34
− Stress testing frameworks were usually not flexible enough to respond quickly as the crisis 
evolved  (eg  inability  to  aggregate  exposures  quickly,  apply  new  scenarios  or  modify 
models).
− Weaknesses in infrastructure limited the ability of banks to identify and aggregate exposures 
across the bank. This weakness limits the effectiveness of risk management tools – including 
stress testing. 
− An appropriately conducted firm-wide stress test would have beneficially drawn together 
experts from across the organisation. For example, the expertise of retail lenders, who in 
some cases were reducing exposure to US subprime mortgages, should have counteracted 
the overly optimistic outlook of traders in securities backed by the same subprime loans.
− That particular risks that were not covered in sufficient detail in most stress tests include: the 
behaviour of complex structured products under stressed liquidity conditions; basis risk in 
relation to hedging strategies; pipeline or securitisation risk; contingent risks; and 
funding liquidity risk. 
− That, had stress tests adequately captured contractual and reputational risk associated with 
off-balance sheet exposures, concentrations in such exposures may have been avoided.
 
It was also identified by the Committee that most risk management models, including stress tests, 
use historical statistical relationships to assess risk – under the assumption that risk is driven by a 
known and  constant  statistical  process,  that  historical  relationships  constitute  a  good  basis  for 
forecasting the development of future risks. The Financial Crisis, according to them, has revealed 
serious flaws with relying solely on such an approach. 
33  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,  Principles for Sound Stress Testing Practices and Supervision May 
2009 at pages 8-12  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs155.htm
34 See ibid
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F. Conclusion
The effects and consequences of the cumbersome nature of the supplementary leverage ratio, it is 
envisaged, will induce some banking groups to conduct certain activities, such as derivatives based 
ventures, away from their subsidiaries.  Other consequences of recently introduced proposals in the 
U.S (on Basel III), include a reference by Myles to a separate Federal Reserve proposal – which 
from December  2012,  „requires  certain  foreign  banks  to  establish  a  U.S  intermediate  holding 
company to house their operations.“ In Myles opinion, if these holding companies' asset value is 
significantly high, they would have to comply with the higher leverage ratios.35
Despite the merits of improved consistency and harmonisation in the implementation of Basel rules 
and regulations  – such  merits  including  enhanced facilitation  of  disclosure and transparency,  a 
balance also needs to be struck between the need to avoid a „one size fits all“ situation whereby the 
needs of respective jurisdictions are not met.
The need to achieve more relevant and accurate results is evidenced by the evolution of the Basel 
capital  accords  from the  rather  „crude“  original  1988 Capital  Accord  (which  even though risk 
based, focussed exclusively on credit risk and did not apply risk weights in a specific and tailor 
made manner to asset classes) to the adoption of more tailor made and specific internal ratings 
models.
Whilst comparability and consistency, which is sometimes attributed to simpler and cruder models, 
may be desired, it is also vital that results derived from such models reflect the reality and accuracy 
of  prevailing  conditions  –  hence  the  need  to  provide  for  models  which  provide  and  generate 
credible results.
As  identified  by  the  Basel  Commitee  on  Banking  Supervision  in  its  discussion  paper  „The 
Regulatory  Framework:  Balancing  Risk  Sensitivity,  Simplicity  and  Comparability,“36 the 
disadvantages attributed to undue complexity and reduced comparability in the capital framework, 
„potentially“ include:
− Increased difficulties for bank management in understanding the regulatory regime;
− The challenges arising in capital planning;
− Less accurate risk assessments;
− The creation of regulatory gaps and opportunities for arbitrage;
− An undermining of the ability of supervisors to effectively assess the capital adequacy of 
banks
− Impediments  presented  to  the  effective  review  of  the  capital  management  process  by 
supervisors.
Achieving an appropriate balance between consistency, comparability, standardization and the need 
35 Myles also adds that this is exacerbated by the fact that foreign banks are the biggest dealers in US treasuries – 
„which are penalised by un-weighted measures such as leverage ratios“ and that further, it is also possible that 
branches  might  have  to  comply  with   U.S  leverage  ratios  –  based  on  how  the  Fed  Reserve  construed  its 
comparability  test.“  See  D  Myles,  'How  U.S  5%  Leverage  Ratio  Could  Catch  Foreign  Banks' 
<http://www.iflr.com/Article/3234308/Banking/How-US-5-leverage-ratio-could-catch-foreign-banks.html
36  July 2013, Bank for International Settlements Publications at page 12
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for accurate results is demonstrated by the Federal Reserve's flexible approach in applying bank 
stress testing techniques. As reported,37 through the provision of a common set of scenarios to all 
firms,  the  results  of  company-run and supervisory stress  tests  for  bank holding  companies  are 
intended to be based on comparable underlying assumptions. To further enhance comparability, the 
supervisory stress tests and company-run stress tests conducted under the Dodd Frank stress test 
rules use the same set of capital action assumptions.38 Despite the progress made by both the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and the Federal Reserve (which is to be commended) in many 
areas, and particularly stress testing techniques, more focus should also be accorded to medium 
sized firms.
37 See Dodd-Frank Act Stress Test 2013: Supervisory Stress Test Methodology and Results March 2013 at pages 5 and 
6 B O A R D O F G O V E R N O R S O F T H E F E D E R A L R E S E R V E S Y S T E M
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/dfast_2013_results_20130314.pdf
38 ibid
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